Buffalo Journal of Gender, Law & Social Policy
Volume 18

Article 2

9-1-2009

Law and Literature: Story-Telling and Norms in Rousseau's Emile
Eric Engle

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/bjglsp
Part of the Law and Gender Commons, and the Law and Society Commons

Recommended Citation
Eric Engle, Law and Literature: Story-Telling and Norms in Rousseau's Emile, 18 Buff. J. Gender L. & Soc.
Pol'y 1 (2009).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/bjglsp/vol18/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Journal of Gender, Law & Social Policy by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

LAW AND LITERATURE: STORY-TELLING AND
NORMS IN ROUSSEAU'S EMILE
BY ERIC ENGLE
INTRODUCTION

"Every virtuous nation has shown respect to women.
I
Consider Sparta, Germany, and Rome ....
The school of law and literature seeks to examine law
from the perspective of literary analysis. It proposes that court
cases are a form of literature and can be studied with literary
tools. It also argues that literature can inform court decisions
and interpretations of law because literary analysis can be
used to interpret legal texts. Literature presents a dynamic
image to the reader. The reader takes up lessons from the
story and then lives them out. Thus, literature serves to instill
voluntary Foucauldian self-policing, the internalization of
norms for compliance.
In this article, I present a critique of Rousseau's parable
of the love story of his fictional ideal young citizens, Sophie and
Emile. I argue that this parable embodies and reproduces
hierarchical inequalities and seeks to compel the citizen to
internalize the values of rugged sexism that Rousseau thinks
best serve the state. I will not so much focus on literary
devices as I will on the actual story line, to see how the story
line creates scenarios on which legislators and judges may act.
Essentially, the story presented is a set of scenarios for the
society to take up and live out. Rousseau is scriptwriter for the
entire French Nation and, due to the universalistic vision of
French liberalism, the entire world. The problem is the stories
Rousseau is telling us are usually outright disgusting, though
they are occasionally (unintentionally) comical.

1 JEAN-JAcQUEs RoussEAu, EMILE, ORON EDUCATION, 1367 (Barbara Foxley trans.,
J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1911) (1762), available at http://www.ilt.columbia.edu/
pedagogies/rousseatucontents2.html.
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Rousseau's position on gender inequality is the same old

story: he presents a symbolic equality of the sexes, but then
replaces it with a real inequality justified by the character of
"natural" differences. The result is subjugation of women
(homosexuals are beyond the pale of course), by and under the
influence of social games. The problem is that in these games,
there are no fireworks; they at the same time both hide and
reveal inequality, inequality that leads to suffering. Rousseau
does not describe the ugly side of gender relations, the reality
of gender oppression. The omitted part of his story is, in that
sense, the more important side. And that is the reality of law,
literature, and gender: gender as abuse, ownership,
domination, and control. Violence is invisible, unimportant,
secondary, and something to be ignored, if not swept under the
table. Literature is the vector to expose or impose that reality.
I. EQuALITY
A. Illusory Equality
Rousseau begins to build his inequality-in-equality story
with a comparison and contrast of the sexes:
In all that does not relate to sex, woman is man.
She has the same organs, the same needs, the
same faculties. The machine is constructed in
the same manner ....
In all that does relate to sex, woman and man
are in every way related and in every way
different.
The difficulty in comparing them
comes from the difficulty of determining what in
the constitution of both comes from sex and what
does not....
All we know for certain is that everything in
common between men and women must come
from their species and everything different must
2
come from their sex.

2

Id. at 1251-52.
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One could suppose that the fundamental distinction for
Rousseau really is based only on reproduction. But he goes
well beyond that and indeed essentially reiterates the same
gender inequality found in Plato and Aristotle.
Perhaps it is not fair to judge civilizations that lived
under another mode of production by our own values. It is
impossible to completely ameliorate or repair the damage of
slavery, racism, or sexism. But we must judge and criticize
these "dead white males." Otherwise, the damage which is the
logical outcome of their thinking repeats. If there is any doubt
that Rousseau is sexist, perhaps the following passage dispels
it:
This habitual restraint [the so-called "natural"
gender relations] produces a docility which
woman requires all her life, for she will always
be in subjection to a man, or to man's judgment,
and she will never be free to set her own opinion
3
above his.
To which I can only say: Oh. Really?
B. "Natural"Inequality of Talents
Having started by basing inequality in reproductive
power, Rousseau turns that into inequality according to specific
reproductive role and finally, into generalized sexual inequality
according to social role. Rousseau presents these inequalities
as due to "natural" merits, but in reality, they are socially
constructed around the roles of dominator and dominated.
Rousseau constructs sex as a game, a merely symbolic hunt.
But in fact sex was, and to a lesser extent than ever still is, the
hunt of dominator to capture and dominate the dominated:
rape is just the obvious example. For Rousseau, sex as hunting
and dominance by men over women are "inevitable" and
"natural."
Rousseau's so-called natural inequality results from
different reproductive powers and the resulting (to my view
3

Id. at 1300.
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constructed) social roles. For Rousseau, this inequality is also
"natural":
All the faculties common to both sexes are not
equally shared between, them, but taken as a
whole they compensate for each other. Woman is
worth more as a woman and less as a man.
When she makes a good use of her own rights,
she has the advantage; when she tries to usurp
our rights, she stays beneath us. It is impossible
to go against this general truth except by quoting
exceptions, which is the usual manner of
4
argumentation by partisans of the fair sex.
Fairly obviously, this discourse is a discourse by men, among
men, about women.
From a literary perspective, it is a
monologue, and that is why it is so empty and dissatisfying
even after history has proven Rousseau wrong. The ideal of a
complementary partnership is the better vision of Rousseau. It
is the reality to create. But the social relations he wanted to
reproduce in the short-term (Christian elements of docility and
familiarity) will not encourage equal partnerships - though the
ones he wanted to encourage in the long term (pagan elements
of strong women) might.
Rousseau justifies a different education for young girls
than for boys by sex inequality, but thereby perpetuates that
inequality. For example, he writes:
To cultivate the masculine virtues in women and
to neglect their own is obviously to do them an
injury. Women are too clear-sighted to be thus
deceived. When they try to usurp our privileges
they do not abandon their own. But the result is
that being unable to manage the two, because
they are incompatible, they fall below their own
potential without reaching ours and lose half of
their worth. Believe me, wise mother, do not try
to make your daughter a good man in defiance of
4 Id. at 1275.
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nature. Make her a good woman, and be sure it
5
will be better both for her and us.
Thus, we see that for Rousseau any affirmation of
substantive equality is "usurpation." The choice of that term,
"usurpation," shows the inequality inherent in his thinking.
Usurpation is an attack by ones lower on their superior.
Moreover, the characterization of sexual dissidents as
demented and of deviance from heterosexuality as perversion
and a source of suicides, murders, and forced sexual relations is
also wrong.
C. "Natural"Inequality of Intelligence
Rousseau believed that women were intellectually
limited because he believed that sex inequality was the
"natural result of natural facts." Regarding women's intellect,
he writes plainly that:
Women are no strangers to the art of thinking,
but they should only skim the surface of logic
and metaphysics [i.e. women should focus on
practical works] ....
She makes most progress
[success] in the moral sciences and aesthetics; as
to physical science she retains some vague idea
6
of the general laws and order of this world.
It reminds one of the characterizations of the
intelligence of so-called "inferior" humans in Africa. Rousseau
continues in this vein:
The search for abstract and speculative truths,
for principles and axioms in science, for all that
tends to wide generalisation, is beyond a
woman's grasp; their studies should be
thoroughly practical ....
A woman's thoughts,
beyond the range of her immediate duties, should
5Id. at 1276.
6Id. at 1494.
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be directed to the study of men, or the acquisition
of that agreeable learning whose sole end is the
formation of taste. For the works of genius are
beyond her reach, and she has neither the
accuracy nor the attention for success in the
exact sciences. As for the physical sciences, to
decide the relations between living creatures and
the laws of nature is the task of that sex which is
more active and enterprising, which sees more
things, that sex which is possessed of greater
strength and is more accustomed to the exercise
of that strength. Woman, weak as she is and
limited in her range of observation, perceives and
judges the forces at her disposal to supplement
her weakness, and those forces are the passions
of man. . . . She must find a way to make us
desire what she cannot achieve unaided and
what she considers necessary or pleasing.
Therefore she must have a thorough knowledge
of man's mind -- not an abstract knowledge of the
mind of man in general, but the mind of those
men who are about her, the mind of those men
who have authority over her, either by law or
custom.

7

Similarly,
Woman should discover, so to speak, an
experimental morality; man should reduce it to a
system. Woman has more wit, man more genius;
woman observes, man reasons. Together they
provide the clearest light and the profoundest
knowledge which is possible to the unaided
human mind -- in a word, the surest knowledge
of self and of others of which the human race is
8
capable.

7 Id. at 1357.

8

Id.
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D. The Critique of Naturalism
My criticism of Rousseau is not limited to the effects of
his ideas (which are rape, suicide, murder, and mental and
physical deformations). I also criticize his basing his proposals
on the idea of "natural" inequality. The results of Rousseau's
ideas are several types of violence. If one sees that the result of
the type of thought Rousseau exemplifies, typical western
patriarchy, is several varieties of violence, then one must ask
whether Rousseau's assumptions are incorrect. We will see
that his idea of "nature" is either ambiguous (without
definition) or circular.
Nature can be defined in at least two ways: (1) what
exists - because all things are natural phenomena and (2) what
is "normal," customary, and usual.
If I say that something is natural descriptively, then the
only thing I say is that it exists in the universe. However,
"nature" in discourse is usually not meant merely descriptively.
Rather, nature as an argument for what ought to be is
essentially a prescription. For example, homosexuality exists,
and so it is in fact natural. But many "natural" law theorists
would never admit the natural character of homosexuality.
"Nature" as prescriptive is almost always used
equivocally - to claim that what ought to be is what in fact is
the case, that deviations from what ought to be ought not in
fact exist as they are not a part of nature. "Nature" as a
prescription presents the idea that a thing is "natural" if it
leads to the "good" - if it is customary, normal, and in short,
accepted by the dominant class: "natural," not as what exists (a
description), but rather as what is normal, i.e. the norm (a
prescription - what ought to be). To use the nature of things as
an argument, to say that something is, and then consequently
that another thing should be, is usually an equivocation and/or
contains a hidden enthymematic premise.
The idea of
prescriptive "nature" is just about always pseudo-reasoning
because nature-as-a-prescription is almost always linked to an
equivocation between the idea of nature as a description
(describing the universe as it is) and "nature" as prescription,
i.e. a description of how the author wants the world to be.

8
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Finally, if the "natural" really is what "is," then there is not
much point in arguing out what it "is" since it is the case, is
even self-evident, and probably does not imply anything
prescriptive, being as it is the case. The sort of naturalist
reasoning which equivocates between nature as a description
and natural as a prescription is inadmissible, but not because
of a supposed refusal of inferring from ought to is. Rather,
reasoning from is to ought is inadmissible here because of the
equivocation of prescriptive and descriptive uses of the term
nature and/or enthymematic presumptions which usually mask
that equivocation. As I have said elsewhere, Hume is badly
misunderstood by late modern American legal theory.
Why is there a presumption of the existence of a
"natural" order of things? The "natural order" is necessary as
the foundation of several value judgments. If there is a natural
order, which inevitably leads to truth and/or happiness, then it
is right to follow that. But "nature" (existential) order (a
description) includes several things that are not "natural"
(prescriptives).
This "natural order" is an assumption. For "nature" in
the universal sense (nature is defined as anything existing)
generally has no prescriptive usefulness (unlike a chain of
statements about nature).
We cannot demonstrate the
existence of a natural order even one iota different from the
reality that does exist. Murder is descriptively "natural"
because murder happens in nature. However, no one would
argue that murder ought to be normal because it is a part of
the "natural order."
Whenever trying to externalize a model of "reality," one
risks universalizing his own individual experiences, which is
not at all a scientific method because it leads to the risk of
errors due to lack of comparative verification and the limited
experiences of any one individual. In Emile, Rousseau made
the presumption that socially constructed relations are
"natural," i.e. genetic. But his externalization of that model is
not necessarily bad if there are ways to contest, compare, and
synthesize the various opinions - which explains the power of
dialectical method.
Comparison and interplay of each
individual's model of reality through social interaction is the
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basic fact justifying democracy in a world based on mutual
respect and mutual consent. It seems to be the best, perhaps
the only, way of conducting human affairs.
Critics of
skepticism and moral relativism were strong enough to upset
the old moral order: it must be reestablished on a more human
and less dogmatic basis.
The alternative is morally and
economically unthinkable - more genocide, war, and pointless
dehumanization with attendant poverty both literal and
metaphoric.
II. MYTHOLOGY AND CONTRADICTION: SPARTA
"Returnwith your shield - or on it.'9
'A Spartan mother had five sons in the army and awaited news
of the battle. A Helot arrived; tremblingshe asked his news.
'Your five sons have been killed.' 'Vile slave, was that what I
asked you?' 'We have won the victory.' She ran to the temple to
give thanks to the gods. That was a citizen. "10
My position is that Rousseau is sexist. I must clarify
that his vision of women is at times contradictory. Rousseau
wants to create a strong, athletic woman, but also to have the
docile, motherly woman. The "classic" myth of women in the
West is the "vision" of the virgin/prostitute (Mary, mother of
Jesus and Mary Magdalene; the proper woman at dinner and
the whore in bed). This "vision" was then expropriated and
used by capitalism in pornography. But the crypto-pagan
Rousseau has a different ideal: the duality of mother/warrior.
Although he eroticizes power and glorifies war, at least this
vision offers more opportunities for women's development and
self-expression. However, Rousseau combines his ideal with
the detritus of the virgin/whore complex.
The better
description would be that there is a sub-current of the

9 This is a proverb attributed to Spartan mothers.
See PLUTARCH,
Lacaenarum Apophthegmata, in III MORALIA 465 (Frank Cole Babbitt trans.,
Loeb Classical Library 1931) (1572).
lo Id. at 26.
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Christian vision of the woman who remains as a relic (and as a
contradiction) in the thought of Rousseau.
History teaches us that Sparta was a militarized,
communist society. Its economy was undeveloped because
Spartans believed that an easy life would lead to weakness.
Their objective was to structure their society so as to have a
strong military with which to defend themselves. According to
the legends, Sparta was gifted with very strong and talented
athletes. Not only men, but also women exercised their
physical talents there.
Thus, Sparta was a hierarchical society on the military
level, but was egalitarian on the economic and sexual levels.
With regard to equality, history teaches us that the best
commissioned officers worked their way up through the ranks
of non-commissioned officers and that the best form of
leadership is informal." History also teaches us that these
same societies have produced women warriors. Thus, we see a
correlation between equality in a society and the quality of its
military force. Rousseau's Sparta looks like an ideal Polis in
several aspects.
The quotations above, which glorified war, show the
idealization of Sparta by Rousseau and that his idea of the
relationship between women and men is dichotomous, split
between the vision of the church (total bivalent inequality) and
the Roman vision (a bond between spouses, but inequality
relating to the powers over children and third parties).
Rousseau's theory is distorted and contradictory on the
topic of women and the role of women in war as well as in his
construction of other physical relationships between the sexes.
He seeks to create a new woman to compliment his new man.
So, he wants a strong woman, a new Minerva, but also a
mother:
The exaggeration of feminine delicacy leads to
effeminacy in men. Women should not be strong
like men but for them, so that their sons may be
strong. Convents and boarding-schools, with their
plain food and ample opportunities for activities,
1 See United States Army, Military Leadership, FM 21-100.

2010

LAW AND LITERATURE

races, and games in the open air and in the
garden, are better in this respect than the home..
12

Likewise,
In Sparta the girls used to take part in military
sports just like the boys, not that they might go
to war, but that they might bear sons who could
endure hardship. That is not what I desire. To
provide the state with soldiers it is not necessary
that the mother should carry a musket and learn
13
Prussian drills.
Rousseau again follows Plato
militarized communal society, saying:

on the need for

I am quite aware that Plato in the Republic
assigns the same gymnastics to women and men.
Having rid his government of private families
and knowing not what to do with the women, he
was forced to make them into men. That great
genius has figured out everything and foreseen
everything; he has even thought ahead to an
objection that perhaps no one would ever have
raised; but he has not succeeded in meeting the
real difficulty. I am not speaking of the alleged
community of wives, the oft-repeated reproach
concerning which only shows that those who
make it have never read his works. I refer to the
civil promiscuity which everywhere brings the
two sexes in the same occupations, the same
work, and could not fail to engender the most
intolerable abuses. I refer to that subversion of
all the tenderest of our natural feelings, which
are sacrificed to an artificial sentiment that can

12
13

ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 1284.
Id.at 1285.

a
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only exist by their aid. 14 As if a natural bond
were not required in order to form conventional
ties; or that love for one's relations were not the
basis for the love that one owes to the state; or
that it is not through one's attachment to the
small society of the family that the heart
becomes attached to the larger society of one's
nation; or that it is not the good son, the good
husband, the good father who makes a good
citizen!"15
The reason for exercise is frankly functional - to bring
forth strong children, a pagan outlook. But at the same time,
Rousseau wants to keep women in the same position as the old
order - wife and protective mother, docile, Christian. Rousseau
seems to think the two competing visions are complementary.
But the contradiction is fundamental enough to be evident at
times in his own texts: "Can she be a nursing mother to-day
and a warrior tomorrow?"'16 Well, why not? Other than the fact
that war kills women's children.
The division between mother and warrior is fairly
fundamental to Rousseau - but it is not always the case
historically. He ignores the fact that historically there were
women warriors; the most recent examples being those in the
Soviet Union during the Second World War, Israel, Vietnam,
and Eritrea during their wars of independence. Historically,
women warriors also existed in Scythia, although the
patriarchy does not want to admit that.
In trying to find the ideal city (kalipolis), we contrast
the Polis in Sparta (communist, militarized, and conservative)
and Athens (aristocratic, artistic, philosophical, and liberal).
In general, late modernity sees greater virtu in Athens because
it was freer, more liberal. Is that the case? Were you freer in
Sparta or Athens? I think the ideal of liberty is at least
ambiguous, if not empty.
The human condition is
fundamentally dependent physically and mentally. We are
believe here he means homosexuality.
15 RousSEAU, supra note 1, at 1271.
16 Id. at 1269.
14 1
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conditioned in many ways and by many experiences. How can
we speak of abstract freedom? It seems to me that the idea of
freedom is used (and abused) generally to justify inequalities as
"natural" and/or "contractual."
Freedom as an abstract
"glittering generality" seems empty of meaning and therefore is
an ideal tool of demagogues. To show this, I propose the
following argument: does liberty consist in choosing to do right
or in doing what is right? Is the freedom to poison and fatten
and harm one's self freedom? Freedom, if it exists, is to know
what is right and to choose to do it - which still is conditioned,
relative, and to that extent, predetermined. Predetermination
and freedom seem contradictory.
So the question becomes in which society would one
have the best opportunity to know and choose to do right?
Let us carry the debate forward 2000 years. In the
1970s, where would one have had the best opportunity to know
and choose to do right - in the United States (Athens) or the
Soviet Union (Sparta)? The former was decadent. The latter
was authoritarian and sclerotic. If you are in a decadent
society, you are not likely to be able know the good - there are
too many bad possibilities. But if you are in an authoritarian
society, it is also nearly impossible to know the good because
there are no alternatives.
This indicates that the question of autonomous moral
choice is a false one: we always have imperfect knowledge and
to that extent, are not free. Seeing that we are constructed by
our society, that we are inevitably the product of this society,
and that our knowledge is inevitably partial, how could we
make a "free choice"? Heuristics help. If a proposition leads to
bad ends, it is probably bad too. The truth produces truths
(which are not necessarily good - something can be true and
bad). Lies produce lies. The difference between truth and
falsehood is revealed here - lies in general do not lead to good
things, especially in the long term. A thing may be true, but
bad, but it is very rare that something is false and good. This
is a general rule, and general rules are not universally true.
Nevertheless, this proposal is sufficiently certain that we can
depend on it as a way to live practically.

14

BUFFALO JOURNAL OF GENDER, LAW & SOCIAL POLICY

Vol. XVIII

It seems to me that the opposition between truth and

falsehood is absolute.
Thus, their opposition cannot be
synthesized. It is a destructive opposition, not a synthetic one.
III. SEX AND VIOLENCE
A. Rape
Rousseau's inequality appears innocent, but leads to the
reality of violence. So, I have to deal with the topical of sexual
violence.
Most people believe what they want to believe and do
not believe what they do not want to believe. We are all shaped
by our experiences to interpret "reality" in accord with our
dominant assumptions. To overcome this obstacle was one
target of Nietzsche in his quest for "Ubermenschen" supermen. The initiatory cults - the army, sects, and police seek to generate, more or less consciously, a shock sufficient to
force the subject to rethink all his experiences. In the case of
dominating organizations, the objective is to destroy the subject
and instill the ideas of the organization. The liberating cults
also seek to shock, but thereby to force the subject to rethink
all the time and to think for himself - i.e. to start to
philosophize and to escape from the tendency to just assume
that whatever we observe is one more case of reality confirming
our assumptions. Rousseau shows unintentional blindness in
this way when he addresses the topic of sexual violence. He
interprets social reality to conform to his erroneous
presumptions. For example, he wrote: "The freest and sweetest
of acts does not permit of any real violence; indeed both reason
and nature are against it.... "17 That sentence is ignorant.
Rousseau seems unable to believe in the reality of sexual
violence or to conjecture that sexual violence is pervasive. He
does not want to see the ugly reality because that reality is
ugly. Similar statements appear elsewhere, for example,
"[The stronger is the master in all appearance and yet in effect
depends on the weaker."' 8 That is wrong. The economically
17

Id. at 1260.

18 Id. at 1261.
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independent sex was sexually dominant because it was
economically independent. Men were not in fact dependent on
women, but women were dependent on men. The consent of
women to sex in that system was mere acquiescence and was
often absent.
The sex-violence nexus is pervasive, either due to
evolution or economic relations, but probably both. In any
case, sexual violence is there, a reality and a pervasive one. I
suppose the sex-violence nexus exists, to varying levels, in most
relationships. And the results are not always (even most of the
time?) "just a game" - just ask any victim. But having an
understanding of this fact is the first step to changing it. You
can escape the "game" of capitalist, sexualized violence put into
service of the economic order. No one has a monopoly on
sublimation or eroticism.
The blindness of Rousseau on the reality of sexual
violence is also evident in the following passage:
The progress of enlightenment acquired through
our vices has considerably changed the earlier
opinions held among us on this point, and one
hardly hears speak any more of cases of sexual
violence since they are so seldom needed and
because men no longer would believe them. Yet
such stories are common enough among the
ancient Greeks and Jews, for such views belong
to the simplicity of nature; it is only the
experience of libertinage [that] has been able to
uproot them. If fewer acts of violence are cited in
our days, it is surely not because men are more
temperate. It is because they are less credulous,
and a complaint which would have persuaded
simple people would provoke only mocking
laughter among ourselves. Therefore silence is
the better course. In the Book of Deuteronomy in
the Bible there is a law under which the abused
maiden was punished along with her seducer if
the crime were committed in a town, but if in the
country or in a lonely place, the latter alone was

16
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punished. "For," says the law, "the maiden cried
for help but was not heard." From this benign
interpretation of the law, girls learned not to let
themselves be surprised in well-frequented
places. 19
Rousseau does not seem to understand that victims of crime
are not at fault and that claims of rape are generally sincere.
Rousseau holds women responsible for being raped.
B. Loyalty
The same vision of super-responsibility for women also
manifests in Rousseau's view of marriage.
[I]t is not permitted to anyone to violate his faith,
and every unfaithful husband who deprives his
wife of the sole reward of the austere duties of
her sex is an unjust and cruel man. But the
unfaithful wife does more; she dissolves the
family and breaks the bonds of nature. By giving
the man children that are not his own she
betrays all of them; she adds treachery to
infidelity ....20
What really counts most for Rousseau is social opinion.
"It is thus not only important that the wife be faithful but that
she be judged so by her husband, by those near him, by
everyone .... [S]he must have in others' eyes as in her own
conscience the evidence of her virtue."2 1
That passage
highlights the fact that social "reality" is socially constructed
and is more double standard.

19 Id. at 1262.
20 Id. at 1266.
21 Id. at 1267.
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C. Objectification of Women
The logical conclusion of the thought of Rousseau, which
was inherent from the beginning, is that woman is a thing
defined around her reproductive ability. Children are property
and so are women - property owned by men. Women are a
capital good: they produce more women. The mechanization of
women to breed soldiers and workers, a common theme in the
West, appears quite clearly in Rousseau's thought. "Women,
you say, do not always have children. No, but their proper aim
is to do so. Just because there are a hundred or so large cities
in the world where women live licentiously and have few
22
children can you claim that their role is to have few children?"
But that is exactly what economic development led to: women
having fewer children, more of whom survived into adulthood;
pursuing careers; and adopting a sexuality wherein consent
became possible because economic dependence ended.
A problem of one school of natural law (natural law as
God's own law, for example) is that when it sees facts in
nature, it does not like it; it throws the belief that law should
reflect "nature" out the window.
Prescriptive theories of
natural law often ignore the facts of nature.
Returning to the critique of Rousseau, he mixes
colonization and objectification of women in the following
passage, where he makes a comparison of animals to humans:
Yet female animals are without this sense of
shame and what is the result? Do they, like
women, have the same unlimited desires that
shame serves to curb? With female animals,
their desire comes only with need. When the
need is satisfied, the desire ceases and they no
longer make a pretense of repulsing the male but
do it for real. They do exactly the contrary of
what the daughter of Augustus did; once the boat
is filled with cargo, they refuse to take on more
23
passengers.
22
23

Id. at 1268.
Id. at 1258.
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Here, Rousseau speaks of animals and slave ships as an
analogy for women. However, sexual relations are not a
combat. Rousseau argues that desire among women is not as
easy to meet as that of men. Maybe the men are bad in bed?
Relations between the sexes according to Rousseau are
inevitably and naturally unequal. His view, in my opinion, is
twisted and leads to twisted outcomes.
D. War Between the Sexes?
Rousseau concluded his book with the marriage of his
two puppets. At least in his sub-conscious, he recognizes the
internal contradictions in his thinking. He describes the socalled seduction of the strong, but stupid Emile orchestrated by
the ugly, but useful Sophie: "The charms of this maiden
enchantress rush like torrents through his heart, and he begins
eagerly to quaff down the poison with which he is
24
intoxicated."
A loving relationship does not begin with poison. If
Rousseau wanted to build a little Minerva, he finished instead
with a spider. The choice of the term "poison" by Rousseau
shows the fear, power, and war which is inherent in sexual
relations - according to his perspective. This pathetic story is
sad and could be otherwise. That is the reality to build.
CONCLUSION: EMILE, A TRAGICOMEDY

Rousseau intends to present several stirring stories
We are told,
explaining the justice of his worldview.
essentially, of the girl who cried rape, the girl who did not
know her place, the girl who tried to be a man, the girl who had
sex with some other man, and above all, the baby factory for
the war machine. The good girl is useful for something after
all.
These stories however shape judicial and political
consciousness and have influenced who knows how many
people by presenting them a presentiment and model of
situations to live out in their own lives. The best use of this
literature today is as tragicomedy. It is tragic because the sort
24 Id. at 1457.
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of nightmares it presages really are avoidable, yet comic
because history has definitively outgrown the world Rousseau
believes we live in or ought to live in. Karl Marx said, "History
repeats itself - first as tragedy, then as farce." As the left
learns to mock its opponents, I look forward to seeing more
tragedies made farcical.

